

66-840/a

24 February 1966

The Honorable Henry M. Jackson, Chairman
National Security and International Operations
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Jackson:

Thank you for being so thoughtful as to send me a copy of your Subcommittee's initial staff report on the Atlantic Alliance. I read with particular interest the section on "The Soviet Threat".

I owe you a lunch, and hope to call you soon to arrange it.

Cordially,

/s/ Richard S. Helms

Richard Helms

RHelms/ecd - 24/2/66

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
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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 57, 89TH CONGRESS)



February 23, 1966

Mr. Richard Helms
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Helms:

I wanted to be sure you received a personal
copy of our Subcommittee's initial staff report on
The Atlantic Alliance.

With best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

Henry M. Jackson, U.S.S.
Chairman, Subcommittee on
National Security and
International Operations

Enclosure

89th Congress }
2d Session }

COMMITTEE PRINT

THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
BASIC ISSUES

A STUDY

SUBMITTED BY THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

(Pursuant to S. Res. 181, 89th Cong.)

TO THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE



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FOREWORD

Because the struggle in Vietnam is so important and because it demands daily so much of our national thought and effort, we run the risk of neglecting areas of the world which are at least equally crucial. But we cannot afford to be totally preoccupied with the conflict in Vietnam. The North Atlantic area is still the decisive area and it needs our national attention.

The cooperation of the North Atlantic nations in building a common defense, the steady progress toward a Western European economic community, and joint efforts of these and other nations in reducing trade barriers and strengthening the international financial system have helped to create a center of stability in an unsettled world. Recently, however, there have been signs that the solidarity of the Atlantic community is weakening.

It is not surprising that the winds of change are freshening in the North Atlantic region when they have reached gale force in so many parts of the world. Nor is it surprising that the nations of this region have not found the full answer to the problem of reconciling national sovereignty with the need for joint action in many fields.

If it remains true, however, and it does, that the hopes of the world for peace with freedom continue to depend chiefly on a strong and confident Atlantic community, the problems it faces deserve high priority on the agenda of the Executive Branch and Congress.

Authorized by resolution of the Senate, the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations is reviewing the conduct of national security policy, with special reference to the Atlantic Alliance. Its approach is nonpartisan and professional. During the first session of the 89th Congress, the subcommittee held hearings which laid the foundation for the present phase of the inquiry.

At my request, the staff has taken a first-hand look at North Atlantic Treaty installations, and conferred with ranking civilian and military authorities, in this country and in Europe. This subcommittee staff report, drawing on these studies and interviews, examines a number of key issues on which the subcommittee will hold hearings during the current session of Congress.

HENRY M. JACKSON,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security
and International Operations.*

FEBRUARY 18, 1966.

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THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: BASIC ISSUES

I. The Problem

The North Atlantic Alliance had its origins in the inability of the victor powers in World War II to make a European settlement. With Germany's defeat—and the presence of Soviet armies in the center of Europe—Stalin believed that Soviet power and influence could be extended deep into Western Europe. The United States diagnosed the danger correctly, thanks to the interplay of minds between Marshall, Lovett, Clayton, Acheson, Senator Vandenberg, and President Truman.

In 1947 and 1948, with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the United States undertook the two-fold task of halting Soviet expansion and rebuilding the strength of Western Europe. Shortly after the coup in Czechoslovakia establishing a communist regime, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, on March 17, 1948, signed a 50-year agreement for economic cooperation and common defense against aggression—the Brussels Treaty. On the same day, referring to this action in a special message to a joint session of Congress on the threat to the freedom of Europe, President Truman declared that—

the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them to protect themselves.

Soon thereafter General Marshall and Mr. Lovett held a series of consultations with Senator Vandenberg and other Senate leaders, and on June 11, 1948, the Senate adopted the Vandenberg Resolution affirming the objective of

association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security.

The words had been carefully used in the order of their importance: "continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid".

During July 1948, in the midst of the Berlin blockade, Mr. Lovett was authorized to begin exploratory talks in Washington with Canada and the parties to the Brussels Treaty. By September the participating representatives had reached agreement on the desirability and necessity of a treaty for the collective defense of the North Atlantic area and on the general nature of the treaty. The governments concerned approved the recommendations of their representatives and the negotiation of the treaty was started in December and completed on March 15, 1949. Early in March, Norway joined the negotiations and that month invitations to become original signatories of the treaty were issued to Denmark, Iceland, Italy, and Portugal.

Throughout the talks and negotiations, first Mr. Lovett and, after January 20, 1949, Mr. Acheson consulted regularly with Senator Vandenberg, Senator Connally, and other Senators.

On April 4, 1949, the United States and Canada joined ten European states in signing the North Atlantic Treaty (Greece and Turkey became parties to the Treaty in 1952 and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955).

Articles 3 and 5 are the heart of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The parties agreed (Article 3) that "in order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."

In addition it was agreed by the parties (Article 5) "that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all" and consequently agreed "that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

Like the Brussels Treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty also recognizes the interdependence of economic cooperation and a common defense. Article 2 obliges the parties, among other things, to "seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies" and to "encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them."

The North Atlantic Treaty has no specified duration and continues in force for an indefinite period. Article 12 provides that after 1959 "the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty." Article 13 stipulates that after twenty years—that is, in 1969—"any Party may cease to be a party one year after its notice of denunciation."

The North Atlantic Alliance has worked—superbly. It is the most effective peacetime alliance of modern times—perhaps since the Hanseatic League of the 14th and 15th centuries. Unfortunately, however, in the politics of alliance it may be that nothing fails like success.

The historic association of North America with Western Europe and the commitment of the United States and Canada to the defense of their allies in Europe contributed notably to their recovery. Western Europe has enjoyed a period of high prosperity and rapid growth. It has made important progress toward building a Western European economic community and together with the United States, Canada, Japan, and other nations it has reduced barriers to trade and developed impressive practical measures of international monetary cooperation. In their economic and financial relations these nations are demonstrating that collaboration and sovereignty are not mutually exclusive but that one may reinforce the other.

At the same time American strategic power and the other defensive forces of the Alliance have been greatly strengthened, both absolutely and relatively. The balance of forces thus created since 1949 and the resolute response to Soviet expansionist probes—especially in Berlin and in the missile crisis in Cuba—have made the policy of deterrence

effective. It has closed the door to Soviet westward expansion. No armed attack has been made on Western Europe or North America, and provided an appropriate balance and resolve are maintained, none is likely. What justifiable hope there is of a genuine European settlement rests on Soviet recognition of, and respect for, the durability of this balance and the constancy of this resolve.

Nevertheless, the very success of the Alliance in influencing Soviet behavior has partly obscured the relationship between the forces and firmness of the Alliance and the moderation of Soviet policy, and has encouraged wishful thinking about the possibilities of a European settlement, if not of more far-reaching agreements, with the Soviet Union. In some quarters the advantages of alliance are now being discounted, while the disadvantages loom larger—it limits freedom of action, it complicates diplomacy, it costs money, the stability it affords is mistaken for rigidity. A desire to experiment—with nationalism, with arms limitation, with rapprochement—is gaining support.

Manlio Brosio, Secretary General of NATO, made this comment to the 1965 NATO Parliamentarians' Conference:

* * * all of us are agreed that the world has changed since 1949, and that the Alliance may have to change with it, though here, of course, is where the divergencies start, in that all of us have our own ideas on why it should change and in what directions.

There is no one NATO problem: there are as many as there are allies who want changes, and allies who are asked to accept changes they believe unwise.

But if there is no one problem, there are four key questions:

1. How do the allies perceive the Soviet threat? Does a united effort still have priority as a means of deterring Soviet domination of Western Europe and of winning eventual Soviet acceptance of a genuine European settlement?
2. How does France perceive the Atlantic Alliance in relation to the achievement of French aims? As a vehicle in need of repairs? Or as one ready for the scrap heap?
3. What lessons can be learned from experience with the decision-making processes of the Alliance?
4. Can the inter-allied dialogue be moved onto a practical footing—away from theoretical questions and back to brass-tacks issues of real concern to governments?

II. The Soviet Threat

Twenty years after the end of World War II, a genuine European settlement is still far distant. As C. B. Marshall told the subcommittee:

The most salutary thing for the strength and durability of NATO is to get our perspectives straight about the probabilities—rather the improbabilities—of coming to an acceptable settlement with the Soviet Union.

Since Stalin and the start of the cold war, a major goal of American policy has been to bring it to a conclusion on terms that serve the legitimate interests of all the parties concerned. The relative tempering of Soviet behavior under Stalin's successors has led some Americans and some Europeans to believe that at long last the Soviet Union is ready to move toward a genuine settlement. Some people even see Communist China as the one disturbing and aggressive world power and the Sino-Soviet quarrel as a doorway through which the Soviet Union may step to rejoin Western civilization.

The Atlantic allies must of course be ready to welcome any and all serious moves by the Soviet Union in the direction of a European settlement, but the watchword of allied policy should remain vigilance—for it is not weakness but strength that exerts an attractive force in world affairs.

Moscow now appears to have some understanding of the need for preventing nuclear war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication. There are cases, like the hot line and the limited nuclear test-ban treaty, where we may find common ground with the Soviets on specific problems. But there is as yet no hard evidence that the Soviet Union has given up the contest for Europe, or abandoned its goal to break up the association of Western Europe and North America, or is ready to turn to serious efforts to settle basic political conflicts with the West. On the contrary, the contest for Europe—in low key for the moment—is still with us, and Soviet forces remain in the center of Europe. The Soviet government continues to invest an increasing share of its resources in arms, to push hard for major advances in critical new weapons, and to reject internationally inspected and controlled arrangements for the limitation of arms.

It is evident that the law of change is at work inside the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe as elsewhere. Not so easy to see is how it will affect Soviet ambition and policy. We cannot be confident that a Soviet Union which may enjoy some political stability with less use of repression, and which may maintain a favorable rate of economic growth, will exert less political influence around the world or be less determined to prevail. Nor can we discount the danger that the reassertion of the national interests of the Eastern European countries will lead to new forms of crisis to which the West has given little thought. There is always the possibility that Moscow may try to restore the unity of the Eastern European nations by manufacturing a crisis centered on Germany.

Nor does discord between Moscow and Peking necessarily increase the likelihood of substantive settlements in Europe. In fact, the incessant Chinese criticism of Soviet leadership as insufficiently militant, and whatever gains for Red China her combativeness may produce, are generating pressures on Moscow to demonstrate its own militancy. Events in Asia could have a backlash in the Atlantic area. Soviet leaders, of course, are not unconcerned with Chinese expansionism. On some problems and in some areas of Asia, Western nations and the Soviet Union may find it desirable—in terms of their own interests—to follow roughly parallel courses. But we cannot assume that Moscow and Peking are headed for a final separation. In time, with the passing from the scene of Mao Tse-tung, some reconciliation is conceivable.

If Soviet policy in Europe continues to be relatively moderate, it is because "objective conditions", as the Communists say, impose such a policy. Should the balance of forces be upset, for example, should there be major confusion in NATO or a break-up of the Alliance so that the Soviets do not confront a strong, united front of Western Europe and North America but rather a Western Europe divided again into a number of weak and competing nations, "objective conditions" would encourage the Soviet rulers to take bolder actions and run greater risks—and Berlin is always there, if no other target of opportunity is handy. We could expect a European crisis of unpredictable magnitude.

The key issue is the division of Germany. The reunification of Germany has been a goal of Western policy because, so long as Germany is split, the division will be an unsettling factor in European and, indeed, world affairs. In the words of President Johnson in December 1964:

* * * our friends and comrades throughout Germany deserve assurance from their allies that there shall be no acceptance of the lasting threat to peace which is the forced division of Germany. No one seeks to end this grim and dangerous injustice by force. But there can be no stable peace in Europe while one part of Germany is denied the basic right to choose freely its own destiny and to choose, without threat to anyone, reunion with the Germans in the Federal Republic.

Unfortunately, however, there is no way to make the reunification of Germany a practical short-run goal of Western policy. It cannot be bought with any concessions consistent with German national interests or Western interests. It cannot be compelled by measures short of war. It cannot be imagined except in the context of a general European settlement. And such a settlement requires a change in the Soviet conception of Russian national interests—at a minimum a reliable change in the means by which the Soviet leaders pursue their goals.

A European settlement will be the product of Western strength, firmness, and patience, coupled with a willingness on each side to give and accept appropriate guarantees of the security of the other. The failure to obtain a settlement is not to be explained by a refusal of the West to recognize the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union. It is not explained by a lack of imagination in the West. It is not, as some now find it fashionable to say, a lack of "bright ideas" or "brilliant policy proposals" but a lack of Soviet interest in any terms that do not take as a premise the continued Soviet hold on the Warsaw Pact countries, and, in particular, East Germany.

There are some doubts in Western Europe about the steadiness and coherence of American policy toward East-West relations. The United States has not yet brought its foreign receipts and payments into balance, with the result that doubts grow about the financial ability of the United States to support its European policies. In its enthusiasm for a European settlement, the United States government has pursued the will-of-the-wisp of rapprochement with the Soviet Union, even though this raises in Western Europe, especially in West Germany, the specter of bilateral Soviet-American deals at the

expense of European interests. In their zeal for arms control and disarmament American officials have been trying to negotiate a non-proliferation agreement with the Soviet Union—as though the West had reason to fear that the Soviet Union might be about to assist its satellites or other states to acquire nuclear capabilities! An obvious danger is that major concessions will be made on our side without any compensating change of policy on the Soviet side.

For the United States to show unsureness and unsteadiness in its perception of the continuing Soviet threat is especially disturbing. Despite the remarkable recovery of the Western European allies, they do not have, separately or jointly, the strength to counter Soviet pressures. For the United States to toy with the idea of rapprochement, therefore, is to tempt its allies into unilateral exploration of the possibilities of transforming *their* relations with the Soviet Union—and thus to create new opportunities for Soviet diplomacy to achieve what Soviet arms and pressures have been unable to win.

The West must not overlook any signs of willingness on the Soviet side to move towards a European settlement. There may be useful initiatives to take in finding specific measures to reduce the danger of war, and in such fields as East-West trade. But the West should act together—or it will risk upsetting the balance on which the hopes of a genuine settlement rest.

President de Gaulle advocates what he calls a “European Europe” existing “by itself for itself”—a phrase which seems to mean a Europe independent of America. But for a long time to come a Western Europe isolated from the United States would not exist “by itself for itself” except at the sufferance of the Soviet Union. And, of course, the French President knows this. A Europe effectively protecting itself “by itself” is far from De Gaulle’s thoughts. He is assuming the constant protection of American nuclear power, no matter what he says or does.

The United States also wants an independent Europe, meaning that we see no necessary conflict between European independence and Atlantic cooperation.

The original American conception, in the time of Marshall and Lovett, was of one Europe—“the European world”, “Europe as a whole”. That is still the American objective. As in the past, the United States hopes for a genuine European settlement, one which would make possible, among other things, the reciprocal withdrawal of American and Soviet forces from central Europe.

There is, in short, no real inconsistency between a truly independent Europe and the objectives of the United States and other allies. But no member of the Alliance will advance this goal through bilateral dealings with the Soviet Union on the security of Europe—it will jeopardize them. Even the most expert judo artist cannot make “united we fall, divided we stand” a formula to advance the integrity of Europe as a whole.

Now, as in 1949, the foundation of the Alliance is a working agreement among the allies on what the Soviet threat is and how to deal with it—together.

III. The French Challenge

No one, possibly including President de Gaulle, knows exactly what, in practical terms, the French position on allied cooperation is.

In the judgment of its partners in the EEC, France has been less than faithful to its obligations under the Treaty of Rome—but it has not slammed the door. Similarly, in international financial matters, its on-again, off-again policies—now shaking confidence in the gold exchange standard, now assisting to shore it up in a crisis—reflect both French reluctance to cooperate and also to sacrifice the benefits of cooperation.

With respect to NATO, France has, on the one hand: withdrawn its Mediterranean and Atlantic Fleets from NATO; assigned to NATO only small French air and ground forces (about 60,000 men); refused to permit non-French controlled nuclear weapons on French territory; withdrawn French naval personnel from certain high NATO command posts; not accepted the 1962 NATO Council guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons; not committed itself to consult with its allies on the use of these weapons in contingencies of an ambiguous nature; announced its refusal to participate in the 1966 FALLEX program; not participated in the ten-nation special nuclear committee.

On the other hand, France took a strong stand in both Berlin crises and gave immediate support to President Kennedy at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. It continues to provide valuable facilities to NATO, a French officer is Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe, and other French officers participate fully in the work of several international commands. It engages, on a bilateral basis, with its allies on various projects, such as joint French-American space research.

President de Gaulle himself states the French position on NATO in these terms:

Above all, it is a question of keeping ourselves free of any vassalage. It is true that, in many areas, we have the best reasons for associating with others. But on condition of retaining our self-determination. Thus, so long as the solidarity of the Western peoples appears to us necessary for the eventual defense of Europe, our country will remain the ally of her allies but, upon the expiration of the commitments formerly taken—that is, in 1969 by the latest—the subordination known as “integration” which is provided for by NATO and which hands our fate over to foreign authority shall cease, as far as we are concerned.

When war can mean anything between instant, massive destruction and a limited probe with conventional forces, deterrence requires an instant readiness to respond appropriately. This, in turn, has dictated the deployment of large allied forces in Western Europe and of allied naval forces in Atlantic and Mediterranean waters. A corollary requirement has been the creation of some kind of allied command organization. Allied Command Europe and the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) were activated by General Eisenhower on April 2, 1951. Allied Command Atlantic and Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) were activated a year later.

In peacetime the international commands, like SHAPE and SACLANC, are primarily planning agencies with such duties as the development and recommendation of force requirements. They also have certain responsibilities for developing and maintaining bases and supply and communication facilities, for training and exercises for an emergency and, in the case of SHAPE, for training inspection of assigned units to ascertain if they meet agreed standards, and for operational control of certain forces, such as air defense forces. These must be ready for operations on very short notice, have certain on-going patrol responsibilities, and must be dispersed on bases in several countries. The fundamental justification of the international commands is to be ready and able to take charge, within minutes, of the forces which would come under their control in an emergency—and thus, by virtue of such readiness, to strengthen the deterrent power of the Alliance.

In peacetime, however, until a certain stage of alert exists, national forces (with a few exceptions) remain under national command. The international commands do not infringe upon the sovereignty of the members nor do they violate the principle of the equality of all members. No member can be compelled to accept a plan with which it does not agree, or to provide facilities against its will, or to designate forces which would be assigned to the international commands in an emergency. There is, in short, no "integration" except as members freely agree to coordinate their policies and forces. It may be wondered whether the objection to "integration" is really a way of denying the need for coordination.

To date, the French have talked about NATO in such abstract, ambiguous, and theoretical terms as "vassalage", "subordination", and "integration", and the discussion has not been put on what Secretary General Brosio calls "a practical footing".

Of course, France may bow out completely from the unified military commands. If France insists on moving NATO military facilities out of France, or on an effective veto on their use, it will become extremely difficult to devise a sound plan for the defense of Western Europe. One need only look at a map to learn why the facts of geography make France an important member of the Alliance. But allied contingency studies show that it would be possible—though costly—to replace the bases, lines of supply and communication, and other facilities now located in France.

France may decide to request a review of the North Atlantic Treaty in accordance with Article 12. That has been the right of any member since 1959.

France may even withdraw from NATO in accordance with Article 13. It would be unwise to assume, however, that French withdrawal is a fixed and unalterable intention. It is not, after all, likely that the "solidarity of the Western peoples" will appear unnecessary for the defense of Western Europe in 1969.

And even French withdrawal need not mean the end of NATO. On the contrary, the appropriate policy for France's allies would then be the policy of "the empty chair"—to leave a place for France at the table and to await, and work for, her return.

The French President now deliberately displays a policy of independence from allies, while accepting the benefits of the American nuclear umbrella. He is playing a very risky game—counting on

the American commitment regardless of what he does or what happens to the Atlantic Alliance. The risks include a real possibility of alienating the United States.

The American commitment to help the allies to defend themselves was made on the assumption that each of the allies was determined to do its part in a cooperative undertaking. But, in the words of Dirk Stikker, former Secretary General of NATO:

This vaunted complete independence of action has created an atmosphere of incompatibility of both aims and methods between France and nearly all of its allies. He who insists on retaining his complete independence of action can never be counted on as a devoted and staunch member of any alliance.

Much clarity on all sides is needed about the price of "going it alone." If the French government does not consider the Alliance important enough to do its part, then the importance of France as an ally will unavoidably diminish—as the other allies do what they can to make the Alliance work without France. It may become necessary to revise and reduce the American commitment to the defense of France.

Under the circumstances, the United States must work closely with Great Britain and West Germany and the other allies who can and do see their common interest in a common defense. If the key Atlantic allies move ahead together on the urgent issues—as they have the right and duty to do—sober second thoughts may in time prevail in the great and ancient French nation.

IV. The Consultative Process

The membership of the Atlantic Alliance includes great powers and lesser powers, each with its own economic and military potential, its own geographical and historical associations, and its distinct perspective: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States.

The Alliance in operation is a group of governments—that is, of officials-on-the-job with particular responsibilities and particular interests who have varying hopes and expectations about how the Alliance may be useful in advancing their concerns. Because allies are governments, their actions are the product of internal bargaining among the bureaus, lobbies, and personalities comprising their own political system. As Richard Neustadt said to the subcommittee:

The impulse to collaborate is not a law of nature. It emerges from within, arising on the job, expressive of a need for someone else's aid or service * * * if one government would influence the actions of another, it must find means to convince enough men and the right men on the other side that what it wants is what they need for their own purposes, in their own jobs, comporting with their own internally inspired hopes and fears, so that they will pursue it for themselves in their own bargaining arena. This is what we did, with Stalin's help—and economic crisis—in Europe nearly 20 years ago.

Alliance institutions, civil and military, are not sovereign authorities, but creatures of the member governments—and governments alone possess the ability to act. Thus, the importance of the North Atlantic Council and other Alliance organizations, beyond their obvious symbolic value, turns on their usefulness as quiet corners where ministers from different capitals get together, and on their actual capacity to produce results of utility to key men inside member governments. If the views of the Council, the international commands, and other agencies are to attract the top-level attention of national governments, they must point the way to the practical compromises which are the very heart of joint action.

The organization of NATO is, therefore, an important but secondary subject—the cart, not the horse—of allied concerns.

It sometimes appears to be more important than it is because the processes of consultation within the Alliance are not producing agreement—and because, as often happens within our own government, disputes over high policy are cloaked as disagreements over organizational issues. Things cannot be worked out that way.

Consultative processes produce an alliance's decisions—they are its surrogate for executive authority. If they are not effective, the alliance will lack direction and energy.

Within our own government, we are painfully aware of the difficulty of deciding on new policies. Decisions are difficult enough when the decision-making process culminates in a President. Within an alliance, not only are the issues inherently more difficult (because a wider variety of interests are affected) but also decisions have, in the nature of things, the character of a common denominator. That is, they must be acceptable to a group of governments and must be watered down or compromised until they are acceptable.

There is, of course, no rule of unanimity in NATO, despite the widespread belief to the contrary. The emphasis of the Treaty is on separate and joint action to maintain and develop the individual and collective capacity to resist aggression (Article 3), and on such action, individually and in concert with others, as each ally deems necessary in response to an attack (Article 5). The only requirement in the Treaty for unanimity is for the admission of new members. In practice, the operations of the Alliance have confirmed that each member does not have to participate in everything the others do—and that no member can prevent the others from taking a joint action they wish to take.

The absence of a rule of unanimity does not diminish, however, the desirability of unanimity. A member may be unable to block a joint action by the others, but if it feels strongly, it may refuse to cooperate on other matters or even denounce the Treaty. Practical wisdom dictates that a great effort should be made to reach full agreement on important issues and programs, particularly those relating to the credibility of the deterrent and relations with the Soviet Union.

In the happiest circumstances, crisp decisions by a group of governments are hard to come by, and the accommodations made in arriving at agreement should be treasured, not lightly discarded. Continuity with a second-best policy may be better than to push a better one at the cost of not agreeing on any policy at all. As General Norstad testified:

We should not destroy the foundation under which we are working until we know we can produce a better one. Not that there is not a better one, because there is always a better one, but the criterion against which we judge this is not whether or not there is a better policy, a better plan, or a better strategy. The criterion must be: Can we get a better one accepted?

Unfortunately, the United States government has not always taken this view.

A case in point: in 1962 the United States abruptly shifted to a strategy of "flexible response." There was little or no consultation with our allies, and the shift was explained in terms which, to say the least, caused doubt and confusion about what kind of counterblows the United States might be planning in the event of a Soviet attack on Europe. To some in Europe it looked as though the United States would rather switch than fight. The change in American doctrine forced modifications in allied military doctrine as well, thus painfully underlining for the allies how little influence they had on American policies of life and death importance to them. The difficulties thereby created have not yet been overcome, especially perhaps in relations with France, whose President, like most chiefs of state, does not accept short shrift easily.

This advice to the allies from the Committee of Three in 1956 is still good advice:

* * * any variations in plans and strategic policies which may be required need not weaken NATO or the confidence of its members in NATO and in each other; providing, and the proviso is decisive, that each member retains its will and its capacity to play its full part in discharging the political commitment for collective action against aggression which it undertook when it signed the Pact; providing also—and recent events have shown that this is equally important—that any changes in national strategy or policy which affect the coalition are made only after collective consideration.

At present, nuclear questions are troubling and dividing the allies. The problem is complex, involving considerations of national prestige, inter-allied confidence, strategy, and East-West relations. The time is past, certainly, for trying to deal with this problem on the basis that our European allies are equal but that one is less equal than others. It is not difficult to define what is wanted: a strategy which will effectively support the policy of deterrence, and arrangements which will win the confidence of the European allies in American support of the strategy in an emergency. Clearly, Soviet pressure should not deter the allies from doing what needs to be done—on that basis NATO itself would never have been created and West Germany would never have been permitted to join—but at the same time there is no point in taking militarily unnecessary measures unless it is clear that the political advantages outweigh the political disadvantages.

Beginning with the hasty improvisation of the concept of the multi-lateral nuclear force, organizational salve has been prescribed for a distressing political irritation—but the salve has converted the irritation into a five-year itch.

Clearly, since the United States has 95 percent or more of total Western nuclear capabilities, it necessarily and unavoidably has the decisive power, positive and negative, with respect to the use of these nuclear weapons. And that power is and will be located in Washington; no President can delegate it to anyone else.

However it may be accomplished, therefore, Canada and the European allies need greater access to the policy counsels of the United States—and vice versa—not just regarding the more remote contingencies of nuclear war, but also the ambiguous challenges that a flexible communist strategy makes probable. What the allies, including West Germany, need is confidence that they are, in fact, involved in major issues of strategic and political planning in such ways as to influence the actions of the United States government in a crisis. And again, vice versa.

Here is where organizational imaginativeness is needed, rather than a managerial pseudo-science which formally locates power in bodies to which no member government will in fact delegate real authority.

For example, there is every good reason why the allied capitals in Europe and North America should be linked by the most effective communications arrangements that modern technology has made possible. There is still much to be done to update present arrangements.

For another example, we should be able to find ways of involving allied military officers more deeply in strategic planning that will receive a President's attention—without altering in any essential way the President's final powers of decision. SHAPE and SACLANC now participate in the Joint Strategic Planning System, based on the U.S. Strategic Air Command at Omaha, Nebraska, and allied officers are stationed at the headquarters of U.S. Strategic Air Command. In addition, since 1963, the United States has committed three POLARIS submarines to the planning control of SHAPE. The United Kingdom has similarly committed RAF Bomber Command. Such arrangements are a good start.

The steps now being taken to develop a special nuclear committee may also be useful, especially if such a committee can be located in Washington where it could involve key men in the central and most worrisome problems of strategy and give them access to each other on matters high on the agenda of national governments.

What is required is access of key men to key men—at the North Atlantic Council and by new consultative arrangements close to, or closely linked with, the centers of national decision-making.

Lord Ismay, first Secretary General of NATO, paid a well-deserved tribute to the statesmen who negotiated the North Atlantic Treaty:

They did not attempt, at the outset, to draw up a blueprint of the international organization which should be set up, or to lay down any hard and fast rules of procedure. They realized that these could only be evolved step by step in the light of practical experience * * *

V. A Practical Footing

The North Atlantic Alliance remains what it was created to be in 1949—an agreement among sovereign states for their defense, with all that implies in terms of political, economic, and military collaboration.

It does not exist in isolation, however. OECD, the Group of Ten, EEC, EFTA, the Kennedy Round, and other bodies and arrangements are concerned with economic and financial problems of the North Atlantic allies and like-minded states around the world. Normal bilateral relations—private and governmental—between all these countries deal with political, economic, cultural, and military affairs. In short, difficult though it may be to name or define, these nations form a community and their community of interests finds expression in a rich variety of relationships.

The North Atlantic Alliance is but one link, albeit an extremely important link, in this chain of institutions, arrangements, and relations, and there is no point in trying to make NATO into something more than it is by duplicating the work of other agencies, or to find artificial tasks for it, such as the promotion of cultural exchanges, to keep it busy or enhance its importance.

Moreover, for the United States or any other member to expect help from its allies on matters outside the scope of the North Atlantic Treaty, and outside the obligations undertaken by the members in other alliances and arrangements, may put a heavy strain on the Alliance. Members can, of course, properly seek to win understanding and support for their policies outside the North Atlantic area through bilateral channels, and NATO organs may provide useful opportunities for one ally to explain to others what it is doing and why, but the Alliance itself does not entitle one ally to claim the support of others on matters outside the Treaty.

In the words of Secretary General Brosio:

To extend the scope—geographically and otherwise—of the obligations the allied countries undertook in 1949 would not be easy. It would have to be very carefully considered and the pros and cons very cautiously weighed. In any event we must beware, lest in seeking to improve the Alliance and strengthen our ties, we bring about precisely the opposite result and cause a split in it.

If the threat to the allies changes or if their interests would be served by a change in the scope of NATO's concerns—if, for example, Communist China proves in due course to be the principal threat to their survival in freedom or if economic, social, and cultural developments make closer political links between the allies desirable—the time will come when the allies may wish to re-form NATO to meet the new challenges and opportunities.

But at the moment the urgent task is to put the inter-allied dialogue on a practical footing—to cope with the hard issues of the present. Getting to work on them is, in any case, the only way of building a foundation for the future.

All agree, President de Gaulle included, that the Alliance has unfinished business. Its record since 1949 is one in which all can rightly take pride. But alliances are mortal. Like old generals, they may

simply fade away unless they are used by, and useful to, national governments in dealing with their real, pressing problems.

The North Atlantic Alliance has not yet achieved its initial, and still its fundamental, purpose—which is a genuine European settlement. The phrase is too easy to utter, perhaps, to suggest what a drastic change for the better a genuine settlement would mean in the world environment. It would be tragic were the Soviet Union to accomplish, by allied default, its long-standing goal of destroying the Alliance at a time when a potentially stable balance of forces—the essential precondition of a genuine settlement—has been achieved. The foremost issue facing the Alliance is, therefore, a working agreement on policies toward the Soviet Union.

Another real issue is an understanding with our allies on what it may be necessary and desirable to do to simplify the over-proliferated international command structure—preserving its essential elements and strengthening its effectiveness while discarding the tinsel and furbelows—and to meet the costs, political as well as economic, of doing so.

Another down-to-earth issue is burden-sharing. In viewing national shares in the costs of protecting the North Atlantic area, inequities are apparent: the burden falls more heavily on some, including the United States, than the others. The problem is bound to become of more concern for the United States because of its relation to our payments difficulties and of our mounting expenditures for defense of other areas of importance to the entire free world. The time is not far off when the allies must squarely face this problem in line with their obligations under Article 3 of the Treaty for “continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid.”

Other practical issues are allied military strategy, including the role of nuclear weapons, the role of the non-nuclear powers in nuclear matters, the size and composition of conventional forces, and such questions as procurement and weapons standardization.

The Alliance, like any other political arrangement, requires leadership, and the facts of power impose a special responsibility for leadership on the United States.

Leadership is needed within a national government if divergent interests are not to stymie progress. It is even more necessary in an alliance, where decisions must be the product of the round table and where the highest position any ally can attain is *primus inter pares*.

The United States will have no one but itself to blame if our preoccupation with other important areas of the world keeps us from showing imagination and sound judgment in the affairs of the Atlantic community—and from showing the largeness of mind needed to reconcile national interests with the needs for joint action.

It may be that under the pressure of events the conduct of Atlantic affairs has gotten into a rut, that issues and approaches have become stereotyped, and that our responses to events have become almost ritualistic. Some new heads may be needed to get the dialogue back onto a practical footing.

In any event, the problems of the Atlantic Alliance call for more and better attention on the part of our government than they are receiving.

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